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ABSTRACT: Following the outbreak of severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), airborne water droplets have
been identified as the main transmission route. Identifying and breaking
all viable transmission routes are critical to stop future outbreaks, and
the potential of transmission by water has been highlighted. By
modifying established approaches, we provide a method for the rapid
assessment of the risk of transmission posed by fecally contaminated
river water and give example results for 39 countries. The country
relative risk of transmission posed by fecally contaminated river water is
related to the environment and the populations’ infection rate and water
usage. On the basis of in vitro data and using temperature as the primary
controller of survival, we then demonstrate how viral loads likely
decrease after a spill. These methods using readily available data suggest
that sewage spills into rivers within countries with high infection rates could provide infectious doses of >40 copies per 100 mL of
water. The approach, implemented in the supplementary spreadsheet, can provide a fast estimate of the upper and lower viral load
ranges following a riverine spill. The results enable evidence-based research recommendations for wastewater epidemiology and
could be used to evaluate the significance of fecal−oral transmission within freshwater systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) began in Wuhan Province,
China, in December 2019 and, as of January 2021, has now
spread throughout the world with more than 99 million
confirmed cases globally within 223 countries, areas, or
territories. Water droplets originating from individuals infected
by SARS-CoV-2 are considered a major transmission pathway
for infection,1 and the virus has been shown to remain stable in
a saline solution2 and under varying environmental con-
ditions.3 Viral shedding in feces of viable SARS-CoV-2 virus
has been documented (e.g., ref 4), and SARS-CoV-2
ribonucleic acid (RNA) has been detected in the shed feces
of both symptomatic and asymptomatic children and adults
(e.g., ref 5), with potentially 43% of infections being
asymptomatic and unreported.6
Human viral pathogens that can be transmitted by water that
pose moderate to high health significance as defined by the
World Health Organization (WHO) include adenovirus,
astrovirus, hepatitis A and E, rotavirus, norovirus, and other
enteroviruses. The survival of the large family of coronaviruses
in water systems has been highlighted,7−12 and SARS-CoV-2
viral RNA loads within untreated wastewater, consistent with
population infection rates, have been identified.13 In addition
to the presence of viral RNA, the presence of viable virus must
also be demonstrated. While evidence for SARS-CoV-2 is
limited, other human coronaviruses are documented to survive
in wastewater,14 with a colder water temperature likely to
increase survival considerably.3 Collectively, this evidence
suggests that SARS-CoV-2 virus could survive within water
and the viral loads within untreated sewage effluent are likely
high in countries with high infection rates, a portion of which is
viable virus. Therefore, water contaminated with sewage
provides a potential fecal−oral transmission route.15,8,12,11
However, identifying evidence of the presence of the virus and
particularly infectivity within water systems (sewage from
urban environments, within sewage treatment works, treated
wastewater, or natural water bodies after sewage spills) requires
more investigation.12,8 SARS-CoV-2 has been detected in river
water of a country with low sanitation methods16 and in
treatment plant wastewater,13,8 and contamination from
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combined sewer outflow events poses a particularly high risk.17
However, data on infectivity are limited8 and have so far been
negative.12 These negative results are from limited sample sizes
and locations; hence, a precautionary approach to the infection
risk posed by sewage spills is advocated.12
Sewage can directly enter natural water systems due to
combined sewer overflow events and sewage exfiltration from
pipes (e.g., ref 18), unexpected failure of water treatment
systems, or a complete lack of water treatment infrastructure
(e.g., ref 16). For example, during the current pandemic large
sewage spills, flooding dwellings and community spaces, have
occurred in the United States (Georgia, Florida, and New
York) and Spain (Andalucia), while temporary settlements
(e.g., shanty towns, favelas, or bustees) and refugee camps are
less likely to have safe sanitation systems. In these settings, this
water system pathway could enable transmission of the virus to
humans or other susceptible animals via water ingestion,
aerosol generation, or filtering of water during feeding. It is also
clear that conventional wastewater treatment methods only
partially remove SARS-CoVs, highlighting the need for
wastewater risk assessments and methods tailored to SARS-
CoV-2.19
The highly skewed distribution of infected patient viral loads
observed20 includes the effects of superspreaders, where single
individuals can be responsible for a majority of the viral load.
This viral distribution means that sewage originating from
populations that contain superspreaders will contain very high
viral loads, even though the majority of the population
contributes relatively low viral loads. This issue further
highlights the need for tools to identify the risk of transmission
and infection associated with sewage spills, particularly within
large populated areas.
Considering the information presented above, we modify
established pollution analysis methods21 to estimate the viral
concentration in rivers following a spill, allowing the relative
risk of transmission posed to humans by contaminated
waterways to be calculated for 39 countries. Similar methods
have been successfully used to study labile organics from
sewage and thermal pollution within global river systems.22
Modeling the survivability of SARS-CoV-2 in a solution using
published in vitro study data3 then enables the temporal
reduction in viral load and risk over multiple days to be
estimated. The results using infection numbers on May 3,
2020, for 21 countries, where inland water temperatures were
available, identify viable waterborne virus concentrations that
could be in the water if a spill had occurred. The method
provides a fast way to assess the risk of transmission associated
with sewage spills through the use of easily available
population, infection rate, and environmental data. The
implications of the analysis from the example countrywide
data for transmission of the waterborne virus to humans and
animals are discussed. Recommendations for advancing this
work and the limitations of the method are also given.
2. METHODS
2.1. Input Data. All dilution factors (DFs) were taken from
ref 21. The numbers of confirmed cases, fatalities, and
recovered cases were taken from the Worldometers Web site
(https://www.worldometers.info/). The long-term statistical
mean global inland lake water temperature climatology was
constructed using the 0.05° × 0.05° daily resolution
GloboLakes version 4 data set23 that covers the period of
1996−2016. Mean, lower, middle, and upper percentile
temperatures were calculated for each calendar month across
all years producing 12 monthly data sets with a 0.05° × 0.05°
gridded resolution. The water temperature uncertainty terms
were propagated into the monthly data set by assuming
random errors were independent and normally distributed, and
using standard uncertainty propagation methods. The resulting
uncertainty term combines the original uncertainty in
measurement and optimum interpolation with the spatial/
temporal uncertainty of the resampled monthly average, for
each grid cell. These uncertainty data were used to confirm the
integrity of the resampled data set.
2.2. Relative Risk of Transmission from Wastewater
Spills. The between-country relative risk of SARS-CoV-2
transmission from wastewater systems (Hc) is calculated from
the per capita volume of wastewater and dilution factor for





DFc ww,c c (1)
where Vww,c is the per capita daily volume of domestic water
usage for each country c and DFc is the dilution factor
downloaded from ref 21 (supplemental Table 1 and
supplemental Table 2, respectively). The DFc is dependent
on the river flow and the total domestic wastewater effluent
within each country. Normalizing Hc* for each country by the
maximum value (Hmax*) provides the between-country relative
risk of waterborne transmission due to the viral load in an
average river following a sewage effluent spill from an urban
system. Note that the maximum Hc* value is calculated using
the country median dilution factors (DFc) as some countries










where Hmax* is the maximum Hc* value from all countries
being considered.
2.3. Estimating the Number of Infectious Viruses
Resulting from a Sewage Spill. The number of infectious
viruses in the water system as a result of a wastewater spill or
leak is calculated by multiplying Hc by the number of infectious







where Vfeces is the volume of feces generated (liters per capita
per day), Cfeces is the number of viral RNA copies in fecal
matter (per liter), Pc is the proportion (prevalence) of the
population of country c that has active infections, and I is the
ratio of viral RNA copies to viable (infectious) virus.
To calculate Cfeces, we assumed a log-normal distribution and
calculated the expected value using the mean and standard
deviation from ref 20 using the standard equation
= { + [ ]}μ σC exp ln(10 ) 0.5 ln(10 )feces
2
(4)
where μ is the sample mean and σ is the sample standard
deviation of the log-normal distribution. Jones et al.20 state that
the μ of the distribution is 5.22 log10 copies mL
−1 and σ = 1.86
log10 copies mL
−1, which results in an expected Cfeces in feces of
1595.9 million copies mL−1. Note that the data of Jones et al.20
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are used here because of the large sample size and the
reporting of fitted distributions and distribution parameters for
the mean and standard deviation, making integration into our
model straightforward. These data come from sampled
respiratory fluid, not fecal matter; however, the distributions
of viral particle concentrations in respiratory and fecal samples
appear to overlap considerably (Figure S15,24). As noted in refs
5 and 20, the viral load follows a heavy-tailed distribution with
the majority of patients shedding ∼105 copies ml−1 but some
having viral loads as high as 1012 copies mL−1. This results in
the superspreader problem in which a tiny proportion of the
infected population can become responsible for contributing a
majority of viral load to the wastewater. For a large infected
population, this approach allows robust statistical modeling of
viral load. However, in the case of smaller communities with a
low number of infections, the actual viral load could be
severely underestimated if a superspreader is present within the
population. Vfeces is the mean daily volume of feces generated
per person (0.149 kg, from Table 3 of ref 25, and assuming
feces has a density approximately equal to that of water).26
Note we used the “high-income country” value from ref 25
because the data20 that we use to estimate Cfeces were measured
from samples collected in Germany. Assuming that the total
number of viral particles shed does not differ between high-
and low-income countries, it therefore does not matter
whether the Vfeces and Cfeces data come from high- or low-
income countries, but the values used should be mutually
consistent. The prevalence data, Pc, were calculated by
subtracting the number of recovered and the number of
fatalities from the number of confirmed cases from the
Worldometer Web site to obtain the number of active cases
and then dividing by the country population:
=P A N/c c c (5)
where Ac is the number of active cases and Nc is the population
of the country.
The polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method (used in ref
20) does not distinguish between infectious virus and
damaged/destroyed non-infectious virus. Therefore, to esti-
mate the number of viable (infectious) virus copies, we used
literature about the ratio of infectious adenovirus copies to
genome copies in raw sewage27 and wastewater discharged into
rivers.28 These estimates varied over 4 orders of magnitude,
and therefore, we selected high (10−1), medium (10−2), and
low (10−3) estimates to represent the large range of
uncertainty in this ratio. These equate to 10%, 1%, and 0.1%
proportions, respectively, of viable virus within the total viral
genome counts, and this approach is consistent with that used
in a previous SARS-CoV-2 study.29
The expected number of infectious viruses resulting from a
sewage spill into a river or lake for a given country can
therefore be calculated as
= =C C H
V C P
V I DFspill,c inf,c c
feces feces c
ww,c c (6)
Cspill,c was estimated for May 3, 2020, for 21 countries that
(i) contain large inland surface water bodies and so water
temperature data were accessible and (ii) were known to rely
upon surface reservoirs or lakes for drinking water.30 The long-
term statistical mean inland water temperature, needed to
calculate virus survivability, was therefore calculated from a
climate quality global lake temperature data set (see section
2.1). The temperature values extracted for each country were
the countrywide interquartile lake temperatures determined
using a rectangular box as a simplified country outline. The
dilution factors reported in ref 21 can vary by several orders of
magnitude and were deemed to provide the major source of
uncertainty in the calculation. Therefore, the Cspill,c viral
loadings given by the 25th percentile dilution, 50th percentile
(median) dilution, and 75th percentile dilution values are all
presented. With high, medium, and low estimates for I, this
results in nine estimates of Cspill for each country.
2.4. Temperature-Dependent Survival. Temperature is
an important variable for determining the survival of SARS-
CoVs19 and the stability of SARS-CoV-2 in water.17 As
reported in ref 3, the virus concentration in solution follows an
exponential decay, with its half-life increasing with a decrease
in temperature, and the pH control of half-life is very small
over the pH range of 3−10 (which encompasses the range
found in natural freshwater and marine systems). On the basis
of the in vitro data presented in ref 3, the following empirical
model was derived to describe the virus concentration
reduction factor due to the temperature-dependent die-off:
= [° ]−r 10 T0.05 C 1.32 (7)
= × −n t C( ) 10 rt0 (8)
where C0 is the initial virus concentration (copies per
milliliter), n(t) is the virus concentration after time t (days),
and r is the 24 h survival factor due to temperature T-driven
die-off. This model fit to the in vitro data gives a root-mean-
square difference (RMSD) of ±1% for water at 4 °C, which
increases to ±7.5% at 22 °C. This parametrization is used as a
proxy for survival within freshwater. Upon consideration of
temperature-controlled survival in the wastewater system,
Cspill,c becomes the value used for the initial viral load C0
following a sewage spill.
2.5. Uncertainty Analyses. A combined uncertainty
budget for eq 6 was calculated using standard uncertainty
propagation methods31 and estimates of the uncertainties of
each input data set; uncertainty values are from published
sources or reasonable estimates. Uncertainty components (and
their values) were domestic water usage (Vww,c, ±10%),
population size (Nc, ±1%), number of active cases (Ac,
±20%), and volume of feces generated per capita per day
(Vfeces, 0.149 ± 0.095 L, from Table 3 of ref 25). The analytical
uncertainty for the mean number of viral genome copies in
feces (Cfeces, 1595.9 million copies mL
−1) and density of feces
were not included in the uncertainty analysis as no values, or
applicable exemplar values, could be identified or estimated
from the literature. The complete analysis resulted in a
combined uncertainty budget of ±68% copies mL−1. This
result is consistent with the published uncertainty of ±50%32
that was experimentally determined for the original method of
Keller et al. (which is the basis for eqs 1 and 3). It is important
to note that the ±68% value (which describes the uncertainty
for the full method, eqs 1−6) does not include uncertainty in
the dilution factors or the ratio of viral genome copies to
infectious viruses. Instead, and as described above, the results
are calculated for a range of dilution factors, and the Cinf
calculation was repeated for high, medium, and low values (i.e.,
the 10%, 1%, and 0.1% proportions, respectively). This
approach helps to illustrate the sensitivity of the approach to
these two parameters (DF and I). For the temperature-
controlled survival calculation, eqs 7 and 8 were calculated for
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the 25th, 50th (median), and 75th percentiles of surface
freshwater temperature to quantify their sensitivity to the
regional temperature variations.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The relative risk (which is the normalized country comparable
risk associated with a sewage spill after dilution) shown in
Figure 1a,b is dependent upon total domestic wastewater
effluent (which helps to dilute the virus at the input to the
system) and riverine flow (which dilutes the virus once in the
river). The latter is dependent upon geographical location,
geographical relief, and weather. Countries with the lowest
relative risk are those with both high domestic wastewater
effluent and high riverine dilution (e.g., Canada, Norway, and
Venezuela). The highest relative risk results from a
combination of low to medium domestic wastewater effluent
and low dilution (e.g., Morocco, Spain, and Germany).
Exponential temperature-driven survivability reveals that the
virus can remain stable in a solution for at least 25 days (Figure
1c; at 4 °C, it can take 25 days for a 10-fold reduction).
Translating these results to the proportion of the population
infected within 21 countries on May 3, 2020, identifies the
estimated upper and lower limits of viable waterborne virus
concentration within the first 24 h, assuming that a spill
occurred (Figure 2; the uncertainty in the viable virus
concentration is ±68% copies L−1). This analysis was limited
Figure 1. Virus survivability within freshwater and normalized country comparable risk of transmission (termed relative risk, Hc) associated with
sewage spills after dilution by domestic water usage and river flow (results for 39 countries) . (a) Log10 relative risk (Hc) covering the range of
0.001−1.0. Circles are median values, and horizontal lines show the 25th and 75th percentiles due to dilution factors from ref 21. (b) Countries
where relative risk, Hc, has been calculated with relative risk as a linear scale. Gray signifies a country not included. (c) Modeled temperature
survivability. The root-mean-square difference (RMSD) for each curve is given by the shaded areas.
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to these 21 countries as only these had easily discernible inland
water temperature data. Absolute concentrations are higher
and will exist longer within countries with a combination of
higher relative risk, colder water, and high population infection
Figure 2. Estimate of absolute viable viral concentrations within inland waters on May 3, 2020, for 21 countries assuming a sewage spill has
occurred. Circles are medians, and horizontal lines shows the 25th and 75th percentiles due to dilution factors. (a) Absolute viable viral
concentrations in log10 copies. The shaded uncertainty bars are ±68% copies L−1. Results are shown for three possible ratios of viable virus to viral
genome copies (10%, 1%, and 0.1%). (b) Lake water temperature and dilution. (c) Virus prevalence. (d) Countries where viable viral loads have
been calculated. Gray signifies a country not included, as inland water temperature data were not easily discernible; viral concentrations are
presented as a linear scale in copies of viable virus per liter.
Table 1. Viable Virus Concentrations for the Three Countries for May 3, 2020, Assuming a Spill Occurreda
country
ΨI = 0.1%, median
DF (copies L−1)
*I = 1%, median
DF (copies L−1)
$I = 10%, median
DF (copies L−1)
&I = 10%, low DF
(copies L−1)








63 632 6325 6325 633 (63Ψ−633&) 67 (66−68) 45 (44−47)
U.K.
(GBR)
47 468 4682 30792 468 (47Ψ−3080&) 72 (70−74) 52 (49−55)
Morocco
(MAR)
46 459 4595 25255 459 (46Ψ−2526&) 38 (38−39) 15 (14−15)
aMedian dilutions (DFs) along with lowΨ, middle*, and high$ viable:unviable viral ratios (I) are given to provide a reasonable range of
concentrations within the first 24 h. &Low DF (lower 25th percentile) and high I results enable the upper range of concentrations to be estimated.
Viral survival rates after 24 and 48 h show how the viable viral concentrations decrease due to temperature-driven die-off. Survival is for the median
lake temperature, and the ranges are the 25th and 75th temperature percentiles.
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rates. A person in the three countries with the highest
concentrations (Spain, U.K., and Morocco) who within the
first 24 h of a spill ingests 100 mL of the contaminated water
could be exposed to a total dose of 46−3080 copies, where the
large range is driven by the chosen ratio of viral RNA copies to
viable (infectious) virus (I) and dilution (DF) (Table 1).
The combination of Figures 1c and 2a can be used to
understand the viable virus concentration after the first 24 h.
The water temperature-controlled virus survivability means
that concentrations will likely decrease quickly in Morocco
within 24 h of a spill, whereas the concentrations remain for
longer periods in Spain and the U.K., where water temper-
atures are lower (Table 1 and Figure 2b).
3.1. Placing the Dosage Results in Context. One
hundred milliliters is the equivalent of one or two mouthfuls of
water, and swimmers can swallow up to 280 mL in a 45 min
swim.33 The dose of SARS-CoV-2 virus needed for infection is
not known. Nikitin et al.34 provided 103 copies for influenza,
and the infectious dose for SARS-CoV-2 is likely significantly
lower because ref 35 ranks influenza as “very high infective
dose” and SARS-CoV-2 as “low”. Therefore, the example dose
highlighted in the results of 46−3080 copies within two
mouthfuls of water would appear to be worrying. It is possible
that inhaling aerosols originating from these waters could pose
a greater transmission risk, as the aerosols could pass back and
forth multiple times through the respiratory system as the
person breathes in and out, increasing the chances of an
interaction with the abundant respiratory angiotensin-convert-
ing enzyme 2 (ACE2) receptors and allowing infection.
Whereas ingested water will generally go down the throat into
the stomach providing fewer opportunities to interact, or
delaying their interaction, with any ACE2 receptors, but this is
unconfirmed.
3.2. Limitations of the Methods and Areas of Future
Work. This work demonstrates a methodology for rapidly
assessing the potential countrywide transmission risk posed by
sewage spills into river systems. However, several knowledge
gaps need to be addressed, particularly if these methods are to
become more applicable to regional or local scales (e.g., for
individual wastewater treatment plants or specific recreational
bodies of water).
The analysis is based on countrywide infection rates and
dilution factors, whereas in practice, these will vary spatially
within countries. Pathogen prevalence will usually have strong
spatial structuring and variation, so the use of regional
infection rates will likely improve any results. Some countries
exhibit high temporal variability in dilution factors (e.g.,
India21), highlighting the need for a higher-spatial resolution
analysis. Notwithstanding this, the measured wastewater viral
counts in Paris on April 9 were 3.1 × 106 genome copies L−1
with 82000 active cases,36 whereas using our (albeit country
specific) method gives an estimate of 1.3 × 106 genome copies
L−1, which is within the correct order of magnitude. These
calculations used the same number of active cases and do not
incorporate dilution by natural water systems, so the values are
directly comparable. This independent validation data point
implies an uncertainty of ±58% for this part of the calculation,
which is slightly larger, but still consistent, with the ±50%
uncertainty that was experimentally determined for this part of
the calculation32 and therefore provides further confidence in
our methodology.
SARS-CoV-2 is still a relatively new virus, and more data are
needed to understand its basic behavior. This includes the
need to quantify the infective dose, the number of viable virus
particles in feces, and larger data sets to study its viability in
water systems.7 The detection of virus RNA in the aquatic
environment9 does not necessarily translate into the presence
of viable virus. To estimate the number of viable (infectious)
virus copies, the proportion of infectious viruses in sewage
must be known. The presence of infectious viruses in stool
samples has been demonstrated,4 but there is a lack of
quantitative data about this ratio for SARS-CoV-2 in stool. We
instead used literature on the number of infectious adenovirus
copies in sewage (e.g., ref 27) and wastewater discharge into
rivers28 to select high (10−1), medium (10−2), and low (10−3)
estimates for the ratio of infectious viruses to genome copies.
We note that adenoviruses are known to be particularly
resilient and therefore likely to represent an upper estimate,
but also that our selected range is consistent with the 10−3
value used elsewhere for assessing viral risk in water systems
(e.g., ref 33), including one assessment for the risk of
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to wastewater workers.29 In this
study, the SARS-CoV-2 survivability model is based on in vitro
data (using artificial saline buffer) and assumes that the water
temperature is the dominant (first-order) controller. The same
in vitro data suggest that variations in pH expected within
riverine water have a minimal effect on survival, but the
combined analysis ignores any ultraviolet, biological, or
bacterial influences and deactivation by detergent. The analysis
therefore provides the upper range of perceivable transmission
risk, rather than providing a precise value of the absolute risk,
and the survivability based on temperature (valid for varying
pH values) is provided purely as an indicator of the viral die-
off.
Ultraviolet (UV, wavelengths of 280−400 nm) radiation
(e.g., from sunlight) can inactivate SARS-CoV-2,37 although
the most biologically damaging part of the spectrum (UV-B,
280−315 nm) is strongly absorbed by water, leaving the virus
particles intact. In contrast, UV-A (315−400 nm) radiation can
penetrate oceanic water38 but is less efficient at deactivating
SARS-CoV-2.39 These results suggest that the detrimental
effect of all UV radiation on virus survival appears skewed
toward the short-wavelength part of the spectrum, which is less
able to penetrate water. The absorption signals of fresh and
marine water will differ, but clearly, penetration of the water
column by UV radiation from sunlight could contribute to
some virus inactivation (as highlighted in ref 40); however, the
inability of the major damaging wavelengths to penetrate the
water means UV is unlikely to be a major controller of virus
survival within natural water systems. More work is needed on
the impact of multiwavelength UV-A radiation on virus survival
and its attenuation in river water, and identifying if short bursts
of high UV-A or longer radiation of lower-intensity irradiance
(as found in nature) has equal impacts on virus inactivation.
3.3. Issues Related to Potable Water. It appears feasible
that coronaviruses could enter drinking water systems
particularly where low disinfection rates are applied.11 It is
possible that SARS-CoV-2 survivability and transport within
rivers could impact water supplies for drinking, washing, and
cooking in countries where rivers or reservoirs are the primary
drinking water sources and where large populations, with little
or no sewage treatment, exist close to the water source, such as
within refugee camps or shanty towns. Riverine enteric virus
transport and catchment accumulation can occur for common
viruses (e.g., ref 41), and under stratified conditions, it is
possible for a river plume to enter a reservoir and subsequently
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exit through the reservoir outlet, and therefore into the potable
water supply, without mixing with the main water body.42 The
World Health Organization guidelines state that effective
chlorination disinfection for potable water occurs at residual
chlorine concentrations of ≥0.5 mg L−1,43 which matches the
minimum needed to deactivate SARS-CoV-1.44 Therefore,
existing water disinfection guidance appears to be sufficient,9
but these will need to be followed to ensure that waterborne
transmission is not possible.
3.4. Recommendations for Reducing the Risk of
Transmission to Wildlife and Accumulation in the
Environment. SARS-CoV-2 originating from untreated
wastewater has been identified within seawater.9 Bioaccumu-
lation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by molluscs and other aquatic
organisms may occur within contaminated estuarine waters, as
other waterborne viruses, including hepatitis, norovirus, and
avian influenza, are known to accumulate in bivalves (e.g.,
clams45 or oysters). Some cetaceans are susceptible to SARS-
CoV-2,46 and coronaviruses have previously been detected in a
beluga whale (whale-CoV SW1) and dolphins (cetacean
coronavirus). Some may be at risk of infection if sifting or
filtering large amounts of contaminated river water or sewage
outflow water to extract their food (e.g., orca feeding on
Chinook salmon). Collectively, these findings suggest that
novel volume integrating viral detection methods, needed for
use within water treatment systems,8 may also be needed to
ensure the safety of the natural environment.
An increased level of animal foraging can occur downstream
from water treatment facilities, relative to upstream, high-
lighting the risk of infecting susceptible riparian and semi-
aquatic wildlife.47 The need for surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 in
cats has already been highlighted as an adjunct to elimination
of COVID-19 in humans.48 It is possible that surveillance of
susceptible riparian and semiaquatic wildlife known to have
been exposed to, or have access to, sewage-contaminated
waters could be needed as an adjunct to elimination of
COVID-19 in humans.
3.5. Recommendations for Identifying the Signifi-
cance of Fecal−Oral Transmission and Reducing
Uncertainty in Risk Assessments. Clearly, there is a
fundamental need to evaluate the prevalence, infectivity, and
viral viability within water systems to assess the risk of
transmission7 and to underpin wastewater epidemiology.17
The detection limit of the real-time polymerase chain reaction
(RT-PCR) methods used to detect the presence of SARS-
CoV-2 within human samples is 100 copies mL−1.49 From
Table 1, the infectious viral load for Spain on May 3, 2020,
would have been below the PCR detection limit at 0.06−6.33
copies mL−1, and 24 h later, it had decreased to 0.04−4.24
copies mL−1 (67% survival). These low values, driven by
dilution and then temperature-driven die-off, highlight the
need for concentration methods (e.g., as reviewed in ref 17),
but the identified temperature-driven die-off means that the
effluent temperature history is needed, from fecal input
onward, to fully interpret any PCR viral loads. The PCR
result is valid for a snapshot in time, and understanding where
the PCR value falls in relation to the viral survival curves in
Figure 1c will place the PCR result into context. The potential
die-off during sample analysis may also be important as some
concentration techniques integrate samples over time.17 The
large intercountry variations in dilution21 and the lack of
temporal history could be one reason for the unexplained
range of SARS-CoV-2 viral loads so far found in wastewater
(Table 4 of ref 17) and the inconclusive viral infectivity results.
For example, if you have a virus concentration value, the
detection threshold, and a temperature history, then you can
calculate when you would expect the virus concentration in the
sample to fall below the PCR detection thresholds using our
methods. If you also have an understanding of the DF (within
the water system sampled), then you can determine when the
virus concentration in the water system will fall below the PCR
detection thresholds. Our results suggest that only targeted
wastewater sampling that considers the regional water usage,
regional rainfall (collectively capturing regional dilution),
regional infection rates, and the complete effluent and sample
temperature history are likely to produce robust infectivity
conclusions for water systems. Viral and infectivity loads
measured under controlled experimentation using feces from
infected individuals, where the loads are assessed at the source
and then at regular intervals after dilution and over multiple
days, repeated for different water temperatures, are likely
needed to support the interpretation of field data. The results
from such experiments and sampling strategies are needed for
wastewater epidemiology. Figure 2a (which is in log10 copies
per liter of viable virus) shows that the results presented here
are highly sensitive to I (the ratio of viral RNA copies to viable
infectious viruses, i.e., 0.1%, 1%, and 10%), so experiments to
determine conclusive viral and infectivity loads would also
significantly reduce the uncertainty in the methods presented
herein.
With respect to identifying significant transmission routes,
data are also needed to enable causation of outbreaks to be
evaluated. International efforts for “track and trace” method-
ologies currently consider transmission from only direct or
close interactions between individuals, whereas data on the
potential infectious nature of the environment itself with which
individuals interact are missing from these approaches. Large
scale transmission or infection causality evaluation that
includes data on the environmental conditions and periods
where airborne transmission and water transmission are
possible will allow the evaluation of the significance of each
transmission route. The methods presented in this paper,
applied at a regional level within countries, would provide a
key data set needed for such an analysis.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Natural water systems are likely able to act as a transmission
pathway for SARS-CoV-2, which is a threat to humans and
animals. To help address this issue, this paper provides a
method for the rapid assessment of the SARS-CoV-2
transmission risk posed by fecally contaminated water systems.
The initial country specific analysis using the rapid assessment
method suggests that public interactions with river water
following wastewater spills should be minimized to reduce the
risk of infection, especially in circumstances where spills
coincide with aerosol generation. Applying the approach using
regional data could be used (i) to quickly assess the risk of
transmission to the public and wildlife posed by a spill, (ii) to
identify regions where more detailed sampling and laboratory
assessment are needed to accurately quantify exposure, and
(iii) to identify regions that have previously been exposed to a
transmission risk. The results highlight the need for volume-
integrating viral detection methods to ensure the safety of the
natural environment. The temporal viral survival model is
given as a proxy for understanding how the risk of transmission
changes with time but is based on only a primary controller
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(temperature) and does not include other processes that are
likely to further degrade the virus. As such, it will likely
overestimate the survival of any virus (i.e., underestimate viral
die-off). The results presented here suggest that studies aiming
to accurately identify the infectious viral loads within water and
wastewater systems, which have been identified as being critical
for wastewater epidemiology, need to characterize the
complete temperature history of the effluent, from defecation
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